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QUANTUM PHYSICS AND REALITY
Bernard d’Espagnat
Laboratoire de Physique The´orique
Universite´ de Paris-Sud, 91405 Orsay, France.
Contrary to classical physics, which was strongly objective i.e.
could be interpreted as a description of mind-independent reality,
standard quantum mechanics (SQM) is only weakly objective, that
is to say, its statements, though intersubjectively valid, still merely
refer to operations of the mind. Essentially, in fact, they are pre-
dictive of observations. On the view that SQM is universal conven-
tional realism is thereby refuted. It is shown however that this does
not rule out a broader form of realism, called here ‘open realism’,
restoring the notion of mind-independent reality.
1 KANT’S TWO TENETS
Is reality something meaningful and is science steadily coming
closer to a true depiction of it ? These two questions are obviously
related and belong very much to the domain of those to the anal-
ysis of which Evandro Agazzi most efficiently contributed. But I’ll
argue that they are distinct ones, and we shall see that at least
one essential element in Agazzi’s approach definitely points in this
direction.
On this subject the right way to proceed is obviously to begin
by considering the second question, in which, of course, by ‘reality’
what is meant is mind-independent reality, that is, the concept of
something that would ‘be’ even if conscious beings did not exist. Is
science in principle capable of describing it ? As is well known, from
the works of Kant, the positivists, the Marburg School neo-Kantians,
etc. it became increasingly clear that a proof the answer is “yes”
just simply cannot be given. On the other hand, the mere fact
that a proposition cannot be proven is not a proof that it is wrong.
It is therefore conceivable that science is able to reach at mind-
independent reality - a position that may be termed conventional
realism - and, a priori, the fact that the refinements brought by
science to our primitive ideas about things make our knowledge
more and more efficient may well induce us to think that way. But
a priori it is also possible to consider that human finiteness will for
ever prevent us from attaining such an ambitious goal and that what
we are able to describe with certainty can only be (mathematically
synthesized) relations between observed phenomena.
A fact that incited not only philosophers but also theoretically
minded scientists to show a preference for the second standpoint
was that, by successfully restricting the basic concepts to just a few
ones - some of which, such as inertia, quite disconnected from di-
rect experience - and correspondingly emphasizing the role of laws,
the Galilean revolution gave credit to the view that far from be-
ing a (tentative) description of the intrinsic properties of objects
science might just be a construction grounded on prescriptive prin-
ciples chosen a priori, in the sense of not being dictated by experi-
ence, and justified a posteriori through the fact that the observable
consequences of the science derived from them agree with what is
actually observed. Kant is generally considered to be, not really the
originator but at least the main promoter of this idea, which indeed
may be said to constitute one of the two fundamental tenets of his
philosophy. Which, of course, immediately raises the issue of how
the said principles are to be chosen. And to this question Kant also
gave quite a definite answer. So definite indeed that we may take it
to be the second fundamental tenet of his thinking (in his writings
the distinction between the two is hardly drawn but J.Petitot [1]
pertinently stressed its rational necessity). It is the view that the
principles in question are given a priori - that is, once and for all -
by the very structure of our sensibility and understanding.
Both tenets have a mentalist flavor. However, while mentalism
is quite explicitly at the core of the second one, in the first one it
is somewhat secondary. There, it merely corresponds to the fact
that instead of being dictated by the external world the prescriptive
principles are chosen by us (with however the redoubtable final check
that the overall theory they generate has to agree with observed
data). But it implies nothing as to the nature of these principles so
that a priori it may well be that those that work - that yield a theory
matching with what is observed - happen to be compatible with an
interpretation of the said theory as being a faithful description of
mind-independent reality.
And indeed it is worth noting that this is more or less the di-
rection in which the situation evolved during, roughly speaking, the
classical era. For, in fact, the inferences Kant had drawn from his
second tenet - such as the view that since we cannot but perceive
objects as being embedded in a three-dimensional Euclidean space
the physical space has to be three-dimensional and Euclidean - very
soon became untenable. Followers of Kant were therefore obliged to
progressively weaken the importance they imparted to this tenet -
to reject the psychological foundation of Kantism, as is often said
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- and finally drop it altogether. Correlatively, as Michael Friedman
showed in detail [2], while holding fast to the first tenet they re-
peatedly had to change its prescriptive principles, going from the
three basic Newton’s laws to Einstein’s principle of equivalence,
via Helmholtz’ ‘principle of free mobility’ and the special relativ-
ity principles. Such a sequence of changes, which has been termed
relativization of the a priori, clearly would not have been possible if
Kant’s second tenet had been kept : the basic structures of human
sensibility and understanding do not change so fast! Two points, in
this, are worth noticing.
One is the fact that the expression “a priori” does not carry the
same meaning in the two tenets. In the second one it has the original
sense of something that cannot change since, by definition, it is given
right at the start, once and for all, independently of our observing
and theorizing. In the first tenet its meaning is much weaker and
somewhat akin to that of a working hypothesis, even though a fully
general, basic one.
The other point is that, as already observed, the first tenet,
considered in isolation, is not, by nature, incompatible with the
view that science reveals or will in the long run reveal what mind-
independent reality truly is; for it may well happen that the success-
ful prescriptive principles, though not consciously chosen with the
purpose that they be compatible with the said view, still turn out
to be so, perhaps because their progenitor was intuitively inclined
to think that the view in question had to be true.
In other terms, a physicist of the early twenties, impressed by
Einstein’s achievements, could legitimately consider that the lat-
ter’s fruitful method of deriving new physical concepts from pure
mathematics had put him on the track of the truly good concepts,
those by means of which the human mind may expect to, finally, de-
scribe mind-independent reality as it really is. And he could consider
that on thinking this way he was not parting with what, in Kant’s
doctrine, remained unaltered and significant for research (what we
called his ‘first tenet’). Anyhow it is a fact that mature Einstein was
a realist himself and that the ‘prescriptive principles’ (to use Kantian
language) that he put forth are interpretable - and were quite un-
ambiguously interpreted by him - as referring to mind-independent
reality.
What all this seems to show is that, while the acceptance of
Kant’s above defined ‘second tenet’ implies ipso facto the logical ne-
cessity of adhering to a mentalistic interpretation of physics, neither
the Galilean revolution nor even (contrary to a widely held view)
the acceptance of the main lines of Kant’s teaching entail the said
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necessity, provided that the acceptance in question be that, not of
Kant’s original doctrine but of a restriction of it to its ‘first tenet’
which just means: to what it was bound anyhow to evolve to, due to
the fact that after Kant’s time the ‘prescriptive principles’ of both
geometry and physics had to be altered in ways that left practically
no place for psychological elements.
This however is not to say that due to this evolution transcenden-
talism - meaning by this the general, philosophical conception put
forward by Kant and developed as well as amended by his successors
- merged into conventional realism. But in, say, the early nineteen-
twenties the remaining difference between the two was essentially
of an a priori and philosophical nature. It rested on the facts that
theoretical physics is a mathematical synthesis of phenomena and
that in transcendentalism it is generally considered an axiom that
to interpret this synthesis as being, or as leading to, a faithful recon-
struction of mind-independent reality would amount to attribute to
the human mind powers exceeding its finiteness. Conventional real-
ism obviously rejects the said axiom, so that clearly, in spite of the
evolution transcendentalism had to undergo as we saw, between it
and conventional realism a difference remained whose very nature
- that of being a difference between two a priori conceptions of the
capacities of the human mind - made it impossible that the question
as to which doctrine is right be answered.
On the other hand it sometimes happens that by changing some
elements in the debate science truly sheds light on philosophical
problems. And we’ll see in the next Section that such is the case
with this one.
2 QUANTUM PHYSIC’S ‘WEAK’ OBJECTIVITY
Up to the stage at which our schematic historical review led us,
that is to the last and culminating achievements of classical physics,
adepts of conventional realism could, as we saw, rationally entertain
a strong belief not only in the existence but also in the accessibility
of mind-independent reality. True, the legitimacy of this stand-
point rested on the postulate - rejected by Kantians as above noted
- that human mind is endowed with all the concepts that ‘fit’ re-
ality. But, after all, up to the advent of quantum mechanics this
postulate seemed validated: Indeed, for a long time theories could
be expressed just in terms of simple, fully intuitive concepts: space,
position, motion, force etc. And we observed that later on - when
these concepts proved insufficient - theories such as general relativity
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could successfully make use of similarly descriptive concepts, such
as curved space, borrowed, this time, from mathematics.
On the advent of quantum mechanics it could naturally be hoped
that it too would prove consistent with conventional realism. And
indeed this hope was entertained, not really by the founding fathers
of the theory, Bohr, Heisenberg etc. (even though the latter linked
it with realism [3], but in another acceptation of that word) but,
as it seems, by many of their successors. But was it fulfilled ? As
long as we consider but static problems, such as calculating eigen-
values and the like, we may be tempted to answer “yes”, for these
problems are indeed qualitatively similar to classical ones. In some
cases however what quantum mechanics yields is only the probabil-
ity that, upon measurement of such and such a quantity, such and
such value should be found (the ‘Born rule’). And at this place a
discrepancy with conventional realism appears since when we say
“should be found” we implicitly refer to somebody who finds, or to
some detection device conceived of by human beings for the purpose
of detecting. Admittedly, in everyday life the corresponding diffi-
culty is easily removed. Instead of saying “the probability is so and
so that if we have a look at this card we’ll see a King” it suffices
to say “the probability is so and so that this card is a King”, thus
attributing the need for probabilities probabilities just to lack of
information. But this explanation calls for the existence of hidden
variables and cannot therefore be transposed to standard quantum
mechanics (SQM) that is, to the quantum formalism supplemented
by the no hidden variable hypothesis. The point is that in such cases
what SQM yields are just measures attached to the various possi-
bilities. For imparting a meaning to them, hidden parameters being
barred out, we have no other alternative than to resort to the facts
that a measurement is a question and that a question cannot have
several mutually incompatible answers. We decide therefore that
the measures in question are probabilities of this or that result: an
argument that involves the notion “measurement” in a very specific
way, not detachable, as it seems, from voluntary action.
Admittedly, from the time of Louis de Broglie and David Bohm
to the present one a number of brilliant physicists put forward the-
ories that by introducing hidden variables could indeed reconcile
conventional realism with the whole experimentally verifiable con-
tent of nonrelativistic quantum theory. Most interesting new vistas
were opened thereby and indeed this line of research is still active
and rightly so. It is fair to say however that up to now the efforts in
this direction could no solve all difficulties, particularly concerning
the matching with relativity theory, and that, consequently, no such
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theory could gain general acceptance.
True, the (standard) quantum mechanical probabilistic state-
ments can still be considered objective since they are valid for any-
body. But clearly, contrary to those of classical physics (with due
reservation concerning classical statistical physics) they are not ex-
pressed in terms a conventional realist would be happy with, since
they involve us whereas in order to agree with conventional realism a
statement should bear on what exists, not on what we see or intend
to do. Statements of such a type I proposed to call “weakly objec-
tive” [4] in contrast with those, called “strongly objective”, that a
conventional realist can take to be bearing on mind-independent re-
ality1. While in theoretical works this particular difference between
classical and standard quantum physics is quite often left implicit,
personally I consider it an essential one since in my view it is the
decisive fact that renders standard quantum mechanics incompati-
ble with conventional realism. Note that according to Kantism all
scientific statements are weakly objective only. But within that doc-
trine they are so just because, in it, the finiteness of the human mind
capacities has been posited a priori as an axiom. In standard quan-
tum mechanics that same feature is an inherent element of the very
structure of the theory so successfully used to account for observed
data, an argument that, in my opinion and also, I think, in that
of most scientists, has a greater weight. As just noted, since the
set of the quantum mechanical axioms includes the Born rule stan-
dard quantum mechanics is but weakly objective and this in turn
implies that according to this theory conventional realism cannot
hold true at atomic magnitude scale. Admittedly it could a priori
be hoped that, at least, it would somehow hold true at the macro-
scopic level; and indeed when decoherence theory appeared, at first
some of its promoters seemed to believe it could be interpreted that
way. But it soon became clear that this is not really the case2. Mu-
1Admittedly the fact that SQM is both weakly objective (i.e. intersubjective) and generally
considered universal raises two conceptual problems. The first one is that, whereas classical
physics could be developed without even mentioning mind, the fact in question, in view of the
reference to “us” it implies, forces this vague, ill-defined notion into the picture. The second
one is that minds are plural, which makes intersubjectivity something to be accounted for.
As a matter of fact, thinkers did not wait until the advent of quantum physics to start
pondering over these problems. It is worth noting, however, that the first one did not worry
them appreciably, the reason being that whoever does not entertain the predetermined idea
that mind must be a product of matter has no reason to consider it to be one. As for the
second one, note that intersubjectivity follows from the Born rule, so that in the eyes of
whoever considers the Born rule an inherent part of SQM (or claim it can be derived from
SQM’s other axioms) intersubjectivity is accounted for by quantum theory. People reluctant
to admit that much may still rest content on that matter by adopting Bitbol’s view that : “the
point of support of science is not an explicit assertion concerning what other human beings
see and think; it is simply a practice of communication which anticipates or presupposes the
prefect interchangeability of positions amongst the members of the linguistic community.” [5]
2In Zurek’s 1982 seminal paper [7] on decoherence a remark seemed to mean that, just in
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tatis mutandis, similar remarks could be made concerning Everett’s
relative state theory and many other valiant attempts at somehow
reintroducing strong objectivity in the picture while keeping to the
view that standard quantum theory is universal. Obviously this is
not a proper place to review all the numerous valuable efforts that
were made along this line throughout the whole century last: a vast
subject indeed, not susceptible of being summarized in a few pages.
After having devoted much time and attention to its study (see Refs.
[6] for a critical survey) what I may here confirm concerning it (and
which all quantum theorists are aware of and is after all hardly
surprising in view of the foregoing) is that, ingenious as all these
interpretations are, all of them not only totally diverge from the
commonsense picture of the world that we have in mind in our daily
life3 but, what is more, are such that in them the link between what
is claimed to ’really be’ and what is observed is so strange, weak
and indirect that its very existence gets extremely controversial.
Aware of the acuteness of the problem a number of conventional
realists, remembering that no great theory is eternal, then consid-
ered the possibility that standard quantum theory should be re-
placed with a fully different one. Of course all its experimentally
verified predictions had to be kept. But, as we know, along with
them it also suggests something bizarre that normally is not ob-
served, namely what we now call ‘entanglement-at-a-distance’ [14],
which, within a realist viewpoint, would imply that when two par-
ticles have once interacted they somehow remain linked together at
a distance by some mysterious eternal bound. Einstein, already,
found this so-called nonseparability inacceptable. A priori the idea
of a theory that would be free from such odd features seemed an
attractive and realizable prospect. And it could be hoped that con-
ventional realism would be recovered thereby.
As we know these hopes were not substantiated. In 1964 John
Bell [16] proved - independently of any specific theory - that to
assume both conventional realism and ‘locality’ (i.e. to bar out
virtue of decoherence, the instrument pointer already has, in every case and before we look, a
definite position, period. This raised questions from such people as Elby [8], Healey [9], Bub
[10] and myself [6], and later on Zurek explained that his statement had to be understood just
in the sense that decoherence (‘einselection’) “allows observers to anticipate what states in the
Hilbert space have a ‘relatively objective existence’ ” [11], relatively objective existence being
defined operationally, by means of a criterion involving imagined measurement sequences.
3The search for such interpretations still actively goes on. In fact there are by now quite a
number of them and, concerning my above mentioned survey, I have to grant that, extensive
as it was meant to be, still some most interesting recent or fairly recent such proposals, such
as those of Richard Healey [12], Michael Esfeld [13] and Carlo Rovelli [14] are not covered by
it. Note however that all of them fall within the just described category in that none of them
bears any resemblance with any of the various kinds of realism that laymen and philosophers
normally have in mind when making use of that word.
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any such things as the “mysterious bound at a distance”) entails
that some inequalities between measurable numbers must be satis-
fied whereas - he pointed out - they are violated by the quantum
mechanical predictions. And indeed experiment confirmed this vi-
olation. By now, barring most incredible ‘conspiracies’ Bell’s in-
equalities have been experimentally shown to be violated in a wide
range of correlation phenomena involving not only photons [17] [18]
[19] but also massive particles such as protons [20] and even systems
such as heavy ions [21] and atomic ensembles [22]. It is true that
practically all these experiments bore on systems conventionally la-
beled ‘microscopic’. However it is notoriously impossible to draw a
sharp distinction between macroscopic systems and microscopic sys-
tems endowed with mass so that, combining the just noted fact that
nonseparability was observed on such systems with our knowledge
that it is predicted by quantum mechanics - more and more con-
sidered to be a predictively universal theory4 - we are led to the, if
not strictly inescapable at least extremely well grounded conclusion
that any scientifically sound realism we may conceive of should be
one in which the locality condition is violated. Which means that
this realism must radically differ from the commonsense sense one
we have intuitively in mind5.
It should of course be remembered that since the Bell theorem
does not include the no hidden variable assumption within its pre-
misses6, considered in isolation the experimentally observed viola-
tion of the Bell inequalities does not yield an answer to the question,
central to the present quest, whether or not mind-independent re-
ality is knowable in principle (the non-relativistic hidden variable
Broglie-Bohm theory is an example of a theory compatible with the
answer “yes it is”). But the said violation yields nevertheless a
most important clue in this respect since it shows that even if, in
4The nineteenth century progressive merging of magnetism with electrical science and
optics with electromagnetism, followed in the twentieth century by the unification of electro-
magnetism and the weak nuclear force together withe the unified quantum treatment of this
whole field and the strong nuclear forces is what convinced most physicists of the universality
of the quantum laws (even though gravitation still remains outside the picture).
5The question might be asked whether Agazzi’s pertinent remark [23] that: “reality is
investigated by every science from its own point of view, consisting in the fact that only
certain aspects of reality are considered” makes it possible to refute the conclusion just arrived
at. What, at first sight, speak for this possibility is the fact that sciences such as biology or
neurology have laws of their own. However, it seems there can exist but one mind-independent
reality and it is now well established that no science violates the laws of physics, so that what
physics shows is impossible cannot be possible just because, within another science, other
aspects of reality are considered. In other words, if such a science displays an ‘aspect of
reality’ that is at variance with the conclusion we arrived at, a conventional realist will be
forced to take that aspect - in a somewhat Kantian spirit - to be a mere phenomenon, that
is, to merely be one of the ways mind-independent reality appears to all of us, due to our
common sensorial and intellectual equipment.
6Nor does it exclude it [24].
8
the hope of recovering conventional realism, we dropped the no hid-
den variable assumption this would hardly help us since whatever
description we could construct of mind-independent reality would
anyhow basically differ from any image we try to build up of it7.
Such a state of affairs may remind us of structural realism that
is, the idea, already present in Poincare´’s works [25], that we know,
not the objects themselves but only the relationships between them
(the equations), one implication of which is that the monadic propo-
sitions contemporary physics makes use of when dealing with elec-
trons, quarks and so on merely describe phenomena in the Kan-
tian sense of the word.True, structural realism also implies that
nevertheless we can know something of mind-independent reality,
namely its structures, and this is an interesting idea. But inde-
pendently of it the foregoing holds true. Consequently structural
realism agrees with standard quantum theory in stating that elec-
trons, quarks, atoms etc. and their attributes are not elements of
mind-independent reality. To repeat, they are just phenomena, and
constitute what may be called empirical reality.
To all this it should be added that under extremely general as-
sumptions decoherence theory nicely accounts for the appearance
(to us) of a classical world (with distinct macroscopic objects en-
dowed with definite, robust attributes and so on), thus extending to
macroscopic objects the above stated conclusion and sparing us the
inconvenience of having to resort to the esoteric (though thinkable)
idea that this classical world exists in an absolute sense even though
the parts it is composed of do not enjoy such a status.
To this impressive list of scientific arguments speaking against
conventional realism it is perhaps appropriate to add the well known
“no God’s eye view” one, a philosophical argument but still one often
put forward by scientists. It consists in the observation that being
ourselves parts of the world it is quite natural indeed that far from
being a strongly objective picture the view we get of it should be
highly dependent of our position within it, same as the view we have
of a gulf when sitting on one of its beaches is altogether different
from the (correct) one we should get of it were we on a plane or an
orbiting satellite.
Considering that quantum theory is by now generally considered
to be universally valid what all this shows is that concerning the
question whether or not mind-independent reality is, in principle,
7Note that this is quite compatible with Agazzi’s insistence on the fact that concerning
the notion of reality no presupposition should be made bearing on its nature, “the only
requirement we need for reality being therefore that of existing, and not that of existing as a
reality of such-and-such a kind” [23].
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scientifically knowable the advent of standard quantum mechanics
radically turned the tables. For, as we saw, while at the end of
the classical era the view that physical knowledge is, in essence, a
description of mind-independent reality (even though its acquisition
rests on freely imagining laws) seemed quite a legitimate and natural
one, standard quantum mechanics is quite definitely uninterpretable
that way since in it objectivity is but weak. In other terms, while
both commonsense and classical physics strongly indicated that only
the part of Kant’s doctrine compatible with a naturalistic conception
of knowledge - the part defined above as being its first tenet - had
to be kept, nowadays if we want to make our general philosophical
conceptions consistent with our confidence in contemporary physics
- predominantly anchored on the basic axioms of standard quan-
tum mechanics - we must give up this naturalistic interpretation
altogether. This means that when Kant put forward an essentially
mentalist conception of scientific knowledge he was basically on the
right track.
Now does this imply he was right in putting forward his ‘Coper-
nician revolution’? The answer, of course, is yes if we identify the
latter, as G.Boniolo did, with the axiom that “we are able to know,
also perceptively, only what we have a theorization about” [26], for
such a view is nothing else than the above first tenet. But the an-
swer is “no” if if we take this revolution to have the more precise
meaning: “while it remains true that the basic elements of physi-
cal knowledge are to be described, such descriptions must be given
in terms of the a priori concepts dictated by the very structure of
our sensibility and understanding”, for then we cannot escape the
pitfall that the said a priori concepts include Euclidean space and
similar notions. In other words, while, as we saw, contemporary
scientific knowledge can only be of a mentalist form (at least in
physics), the way of being so Kant ascribed to it must be rejected.
Fortunately standard quantum mechanics yields here a working an-
swer for besides being weakly objective the probabilistic statements
linked with the Born rule have another significant feature not ob-
viously generalizable to all weakly objective statements: They are
explicitly predictive of observational results. And it is a striking
fact indeed that while, viewed as just rules for predicting future
measurement outcomes the quantum mechanical axioms (with their
apex, the Born Rule, included) were immensely fruitful in explain-
ing and predicting effects and never led to erroneous predictions, all
attempts at interpreting them as descriptive laws led, up to now, to
hosts of consistency difficulties. This shows, I think, that quantum
mechanics is in fact an essentially operationalist theory and that,
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as such, it does not describe anything - not even mere phenomena
in the Kantian sense - except in a sort of figurative and somewhat
allegoric way, grounded on abstractions being made from contexts
that, if questions other than the one at hand were considered, could
not be legitimately abstracted from.
But do these inferences, that I deem conclusive concerning physics
and even science in general, imply that the notion of a mind-independent
reality is altogether meaningless ? In the next sections I shall try to
explain why I consider they do not.
3 ARGUMENTS INDICATING THAT THEMIND-INDEPENDENT
REALITY NOTION HAS TO BE KEPT
When Kant put forward his conception he declared the thing-in-
itself (another name for mind-independent reality) to be unknow-
able; but he carefully kept the notion. Later the neo-Kantians dis-
carded it, but there are reasons for not following them on this issue.
True, none of these reasons emerges from science. They all are but
of a philosophical nature. However, I take the three following ones
to be well worth considering.
Reason 1
This is just the fact that we are not permitted to believe in any
theory we like. It recurrently happens that extremely ingenious the-
ories, quite elegant mathematically, are disproved by experiments.
Clearly something resists us and, though not impossible logically,
the idea that also this something should be us seems in fact hardly
conceivable. In other words there must exist something that is not
mind-dependent. Scientists being deeply aware that their theories
have to pass the test of experiment, this reason is presumably the
one that will sound the most convincing to them.
Reason 2
As many thinkers pointed out, Descartes’ Cogito does not prove the
existence of a personal ‘I’. Nor does it prove that thought does not
derive from matter. And it is not a syllogism. But still, it expresses
our inner experience of the existence of something - consciousness,
thought - existing not just as a representation (for consciousness
would then be a representation to itself, which makes no sense) but
as something - the seat of representations - definitely more funda-
mental than any representation : in other words existing on a deeper
mode. As we see, this inner experience we have suffices to show that
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such a notion of existing in a deeper mode than phenomena do, a
mode we may agree to call ‘in se’, has a meaning. And, since to
think one must first exist - and precisely in that sense - it is clear
that such a basic notion of existence is prior to that of thought.
Now, when things are considered under this light the idea that ex-
istence in se is not restricted to consciousness appears to be, if not
compelling, at least extremely natural. Be it only because it would
seem quite presumptuous indeed to believe that the whole of what
exists in such a strong sense is, in essence, us.
Reason 3
It is just the remark that at least in its most commonly received
version [27]8 structural realism includes the assumption both that
mind-independent reality exists and that most important elements
of it - the objects - will for ever remain unknowable. Similarly one of
the above mentioned objections to conventional realism, namely the
‘no God’s eye view’ one, while showing that mind-independent real-
ity is not knowable or at least, not as it really is, still obviously
assumes that this reality exists. Consequently whoever grounds
his/her rejection of conventional realism on either structural real-
ism or the ‘no God’s eye view’ argument cannot consistently deny
the existence of the unknowable. He/she has to take the notion of an
unknowable reality to be a meaningful one (and the same, of course,
is true concerning the cosmologists who take the ‘multiverses’ notion
into consideration).
A ‘Reason 4’ - considered very strong by the persons in the opin-
ion of whom it is scientifically established that consciousness emerges
from matter - is just that, obviously, neither transcendentalism nor
the conceptions that, similarly, define whatever is meaningful by
referring to sensations, perceptions etc., that is, ultimately, to con-
sciousness, are logically compatible with the opinion in question.
Personally I do not share the said opinion so that I do not take this
fourth reason to be a valid one. Still, I believe it is one that has had
a prominent role in inciting physicists to look for ways of recovering
realism.
I think this state of affairs justifies a renewed attempt at philo-
sophically reflecting about realism even though it is clear from the
content of Section 2 that anyhow, whatever realism we may concoct
8The hypothesis has also been considered [28] that only structures are real, but there are
objections to this [29], one of them (elementary but still not easily disposed of) being that
relations without relata are unthinkable.
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will have to differ very much from everything we think we learned
from both experience and experiment (as H.Zwirn put it: “it seems
that, for the first time in the history of philosophy, choosing to be-
lieve in the existence of a world external to all observers and roughly
consonant with what we perceive is not possible any more” [30]). In
the following Section such an endeavor is described9.
4 TWO NOTIONS OF REALITY, OPEN REALISM
In philosophy realism is usually defined to be the idea that the
notion of a mind-independent reality is not void (there truly is such
a reality) and that the said reality is knowable by us, at least in
principle. In essence this is the conception Evandro Agazzi referred
to when he described : “the basic ‘realist’ attitude of any knowing
subject” to be that “this subject [] believes [his] knowledge actually
to be of something other [than himself]”, and stressed a few lines
further that “this ontologically distinct world must nevertheless be
accessible to the subject” [32].
Obviously, according to this definition - and these Agazzi quota-
tions as well - conventional realism is a combination of two distinct
views: the idea that the notion of a mind-independent reality is
meaningful and the one that this reality is in principle knowable by
human beings. Now, it is a fact that from a purely logical point
of view nothing forces us to combine the two together. In other
terms, the notion of a reality being what it is quite independently of
whether or not it is partly or totally knowable is by no means logi-
cally inconsistent. True, such a statement may at first sight sound
surprising considering the classic objection that the idea of an ab-
solutely (alias in principle) unknowable reality seems meaningless.
A moment attention shows however that the inference: “if an idea
refers to something unknowable it has no meaning” is consistent
only if the meaning of the phrase “to have a meaning” - or “to have
no meaning” - is itself defined by (partly or totally) referring to us
(to our abilities at perceiving or conceptualizing or acting or etc.).
But this ultimate reference to us - a characteristic feature of ideal-
ism - is precisely what realism is meant to avoid. In other words, as
9The idea that consciousness and empirical reality (the phenomena composing the world)
generate one another is to be found in the works of several authors including myself [31] and
is sometimes considered a substitute to the mind-independent reality notion. This view is
questionable however for to claim the phenomena are generated by consciousness means they
are appearances to it and it seems unthinkable that a mere appearance should produce - or
generate - anything, consciousness in particular. And resorting to the well-known alternative
definition of causality, namely the ‘regularity’ one, according to which a causal link is just an
instantiation of some general law, does not help since no known law exists that could here be
referred to.
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soon as we have endorsed the notion of a mind-independent reality
we have to consider it to be a primary one that is, one that does not
have to be defined or, in other terms, has a meaning by itself, quite
independently of our abilities. And this invalidates the objection10.
Consequently, it is appropriate to take into consideration two
very different versions of realism, both meaningful. From now on
we shall, by convention, call ‘open realism’ just the idea that the
notion of mind-independent reality has a meaning and is valid and
we shall keep the expression ‘conventional realism’ for designating,
as above, open realism supplemented with the assumption that the
entities accepted scientific theories deal with, far from being mere
appearances, are elements of mind-independent reality. The open
realism notion may, at first sight, look disconcerting but, as already
noted, in fact it is, in a way, implicitly postulated by the structural
realists as well as by the many philosophers and scientists who quite
pertinently point out that since we ourselves are parts of reality it
would be most preposterous on our part to maintain we can get a
God’s eye view of it.
Of course, for open realism not to be a purely gratuitous con-
jecture devoid of any bearing on what we think or feel it must be
assumed that between the reality it refers to and ourselves some
causal links somehow exist. In other words it must be assumed that
the said reality generates in our mind some pieces of knowledge.
Considered alone, this hypothesis in no way implies that we are
thereby informed about what reality ‘truly is’, for the said pieces
of knowledge may well be mere recipes for predicting some of our
future impressions (or they may even be some pieces of informa-
tion about it, but uncertain, and so scarce as not to allow for a
description). Hence the hypothesis in question, contrary to the one
of conventional realism, lays itself open to no sharp refutation either
from a scientific or a philosophical provenance.
Things being so, I proposed [31,6,4] a balanced view consisting
in considering that the mind-independent reality notion is meaning-
ful, that this entity - which most presumably is not imbedded in
space-time - truly ’is’ (exists, and not merely in our thought), but
is essentially unknowable (in the sense of not being describable with
concepts), so that what both commonsense and science refer to and
are able to really describe is merely what it generates in our mind
and we called empirical reality. Obviously this distinction between
10In other terms, pertinent as the celebrated Wittgenstein axiom “whereof we cannot speak,
thereof we must keep silent” may be, it remains true that even though such an unknowable
reality is not something we should try to describe, still we may entertain the idea of its
existence.
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two notions of reality is consonant with quite a fundamental one
the need for which Evandro Agazzi powerfully stressed, to wit the
distinction between the sense and the reference of a concept (see e.g.
[23]). As I see things, its necessity rests on two pillars.
The first one is the circumstance that science, and in particular
physics - just due to the continuous enlargement of its field of re-
search (toward the very small, the very large etc.) - increasingly
meets with problems traditionally considered to lie in the realm of
metaphysics, so that it has to be more and more careful to avoid
admixture of some imprecise notions to be found in the latter, which
implies that to deserve the qualification scientific an inference must
be grounded on references fulfilling stricter and stricter require-
ments. Since, considering the arguments of Section 2, it seems fairly
clear that contemporary physics essentially is a purely operational-
ist theory the said references must ultimately be to intersubjectively
valid elementary perceptions (‘perception’ meaning here the mental
act of perceiving).
And the second pillar is just the set of reasons enumerated in
Section 3 (see especially Reason 2), which, I think, convincingly in-
dicate that the said human elementary perceptions simply cannot
constitute the whole of what exists. Which means that the inter-
subjective mental events - which are, in the last resort, all that
physics may refer to and report on - do not include everything that
is existentially meaningful. As above noted, these reasons are not
scientific ones; but the fact that conventional realism failed is scien-
tific (i.e. is grounded on arguments of a scientific nature), so that,
even for a scientist, the choice between possible rational standpoints
is restricted. Roughly speaking it is between the one described here
and pure transcendentalism and the arguments of Section 3 speak
in favor of the former.
They do so all the more as they seem to indicate that, as noted
above, in some way mind-independent reality produces in our minds
elements of knowledge, although ones of such a nature as not to
allow for actual descriptions of it. Of course the most powerful evi-
dence that this is indeed the case is just precisely that physics makes
predictions that turn out right: for, to repeat, such predictions fol-
low from rules (ultimately, the basic quantum mechanical axioms)
that unquestionably are elements of knowledge, are most unlikely
to be mere inventions of ours (see Section 3, Reason 1) and must
therefore proceed from something that is not us. Now, once this has
been duly acknowledged it becomes possible and even rather natural
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to hold that this something also imparts to us11 other elements of
knowledge, some of which, conceivably, may even indicate elements
of itself although we cannot know whether or not this is the case
(the fundamental constants, for example, fall into that category).
Finally, since we cannot know anything for sure concerning this
mind-independent reality - this ‘ground of things’ - it is also con-
ceivable - even though merely conceivable ! - that some elements of
our experience are dim signs of its true nature12. So that, contrary
to what was the case in the classical physics glorious days, admirers,
say, of classical music, or nature lovers, may quite consistently and
rationally choose to entertain the belief that the emotions they feel
when listening to a concert or just looking at appealing landscapes
do open to them some kind of a window looking out on the ‘ground
of things’.
Admittedly this conception raises new questions concerning both
matter and consciousness. Regarding matter a received view dur-
ing the said classical days was that it is, by definition, what the
physical science deals with, which implies it was considered know-
able, at least in principle. And when, even today, we make use of the
word matter we have in mind the idea of something the most impor-
tant features of which scientific research is somehow able to master.
Clearly therefore, short of imparting to it a meaning opposite to
the one it has in common language we cannot use it for designat-
ing the essentially unknowable mind-independent reality we formed
here the notion of. In common language matter means something
like the set of the atoms or elementary particles or etc. (together
with the corresponding fields) and this, in the conception in hand,
implies viewing matter just as a set of phenomena, that is, a set of
mere appearances to consciousness.
Concerning consciousness this, in turn, has the immediate but
apparently baffling consequence that it renders meaningless the hy-
pothesis considered by most scientists to be the most reasonable one,
namely that consciousness emerges from matter : for indeed in the
present context this hypothesis would amount to asserting that con-
sciousness emerges from appearances to consciousness, which makes
no sense. Bearing this in mind, an idea that seems rather natural
is to substitute to the said hypothesis the one that consciousness
emerges from mind-independent reality: a view that while sounding
11‘Us’ who may be, or not be, just pieces of it Such purely metaphysical questions are
fascinating but, unfortunately, seem to lie somewhat beyond the borderline of the domain
human thinking may safely venture into.
12M.Bitbol noted [33] the similarity between this hypothesis of mine and the one Russell
put forward in The Analysis of Matter, according to which without having any knowledge of
the thing-in-itself, still, we enjoy an indescribable acquaintance with it.
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rather similar to the hypothesis in question in fact altogether differs
from it since it means consciousness emerges from something that
lies beyond our intellectual grasp.
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